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PRAGMATIC COMPETITION-A COALESCENCE
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
by Jason C. Blackford*
In the vocabulary of the social control of business, no term is
more praised, more condemned, more desired, and at the same time,
less understood than "competition". This simple word forms the basis
for our present national antitrust policy. Yet, "competition" has a
different meaning for the attorney, the economist and the businessman.
These real and theoretical differences stand in the way of the develop-
ment of a comprehensive and coherent policy for the control of busi-
ness. It is time to recognize and to coalesce these differences.
It is submitted that many judges and attorneys, both in private prac-
tice and in government, are so involved with doing legal gymnastics
with the concept of competition that they ignore the basic premise
underlying any legislation regulating business. In this juggling of
"competition", many have interpreted "competition" as a market
structure where the individual firms possess a minimum of economic
power. This concept of competition forsakes economic realities and
seeks a specific type of market structure rather than the ultimate so-
cial benefits of lower prices, improved product quality and increased
technological innovation. The use of a market structure test has re-
sulted in the protection of individual competitors within the market
and to a degree reduced the competitive atmosphere. The purpose
of Government regulation should be to create beneficial economic re-
sults rather than to design an artificial market structure.
It is the thesis of this article that it is impossible to reconcile the
existing legal concepts of "competition", based primarily on market
structure, with modern economic theories. New legal criteria, not based
on the structure of a market, must be developed to conform with
modern theory. To substantiate this hypothesis, an analysis will be
undertaken of the development of present legal policy (based on mar-
ket structure wherein none of the individual firms possess a substan-
tial degree of economic power) and the concept of "competition".
Specific attention will be directed toward the economic concepts which
the legislative branch and the courts believe underlie the antitrust laws.
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This analysis will be confined to the statutory prohibitions against
monopoly and monopolization. Restrictive trade and pricing practices
which affect or are incident to economic power will be excluded.
There will be an attempt to explain in layman's terms, the evolution
of present economic theories of competition. It will be shown that
the economic theories upon which many of the courts and the drafters
of the Sherman Act relied are no longer completely accepted as valid.
A kaleidoscope review will be undertaken of the last seventy years
in the world in which business functions. Special attention will be
directed toward government policies which have been enacted that tend
to produce results directly opposite the goals of the present antitrust
laws. Finally, an attempt will be made to synthesize law and economics
in a pragmatic approach to the concept of "competition".
I. LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
The legal prohibitions against the economic power of individual
business units are not recent developments but go back as far as the
time of Roman Emperor Zeno.' English common law and statutes pro-
hibited trade practices which hindercd the free flow of commerce. They
also outlawed monopolies, granted by the Crown, which created undesir-
able economic consequences, such as increased prices and the deteriora-
tion of goods. 2 While the United States shared England's common law
heritage,3 legislative action forms the basis of our national antitrust
policy.
The substantive provisions of the present antitrust laws are few and
brief. They are largely contained in seven sections of three statutes-
1 For an excellent study of the history and development of Antitrust Law see H.
TOOJLMIN, JR., A TREATISE ON THE ANTI-TRUST LAws OF THE UNrrED STATES (1949)
[hereinafter cited as TouLuaNl.
The Emperor Zeno promulgated laws against monopolies and against any combination
which sought to inflate the price of merchandise. Those violating those prohibitions
were subject to forfeiture of their goods or to banishment. 1 TouLmIN supra, at 24.
2 Hawkins, following Lord Coke's definition, 3 Coke's Inst. 181, c. 85, defined a
monopoly as an "allowance by the king to a particular person or persons of the sole
buying, selling, making, working or using of anything whereby the subject in general
is restrained from the freedom of manufacturing or trading which he had before."
Hawkins, P.C. bk. 1, c. 29, quoted in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
51-52 (1910). See also 1 TOULmIN, supra note 1, at 32.
3 For a thorough analysis of the common law development see Jones, Historical
Development of the Law of Business Competition, 35 YALE L.J. 905, 906-20 (1926);
Letwin, The English Common Lav Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 355
(1954); Davies, Further Light on the Case of Monopolies, 48 L.Q. REv. 394 (1932).
The turning point in this development was the Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. I, c. 3
(1623-24), wherein royal monopolies were rendered illegal. See H. ThoRELLi, THm
FEDERAL ANITRusT POLICY 26 (1955).
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-The Sherman Act of 1890,4 the Clayton Act and its amendments, and
the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.0 Four of these seven sub-
stantive provisions, to-wit, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Sections 7
and 8 of the Clayton Act, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act directly regulate business activity other than trade prac-
tices.
1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act - declares illegal (a) monopolization,
(b) attempts to monopolize, and (c) combination or conspiracies
to monopolize.
2. Section 7 of the Clayton Act - prohibits acquisitions, the effect of
which "may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create
a monopoly."
3. Section 8 of the Clayton Act - prohibits (a) interlocking bank
directorates, (b) interlocking directorates of corporations with a
net worth of more than one million dollars, and (c) interlocking
directorates between railroads and their suppliers.
4. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act - declares unlawful,
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive practices in
commerce.
The Sherman Act does not refer to competition in any manner, in-
stead, it uses the term "monopolize". There is no statutory definition
of "monopolize"-its meaning has instead been developed by the courts.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act uses the word "competition" and "mo-
nopoly" but does not define either.
The initial step in the inquiry as to the legal meaning of "mo-
nopolize", "competition" and "monopoly" under the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts will be to review briefly their legislative history.
A. The Intent of Congress in Enactment of the
Antitrust Laws.
It is not the purpose of this article to delve extensively into the minds
of the senators and congressmen who drafted the antitrust legislation and
participated in the legislative debates. Exhaustive analyses of these leg-
islative histories have been detailed elsewhere." It is sufficient to gen-
eralize that Congress, in its enactment of the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act was attempting to correct certain abuses wrought by large
accumulations of capital. The recurrent themes that run throughout
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18, 19 (1964).
6 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
7 H. THORELLY, supra note 3, at 225-32; A. WALKER, ISTORY OF THE SHERMAN
LAw (1910); D. M.RTr, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON AcT 43-56 (1959).
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the legislative development of the Acts are a fear of the power of large
accumulations of capital and a desire to avoid price increases, product
deterioration and quantity restriction." No senator or congressman
advocated any specific market structure which required numerous small
and independent economic units. On the contrary, many recog-
nized the need for sufficient capital to assume large risks and to market
complicated products.' In retrospect, commentators have asserted that
the enactment of the Sherman Act was a manifestation of Social Darwin-
ism and the Protestant Ethic of that era.10 Undoubtedly, the concept
of laissez-faire which was widely accepted at that time and the rural
composition of Congress were factors in the enactment of the Sherman
Act and the original Clayton Act. But it is impossible to determine the
extent of the impact of these doctrines.
The role of the economist in the formulation of the Sherman Act
and the original Clayton Act was minimal. Not one economist was
asked to testify before the investigating congressional committee which
formulated the Sherman Act. In the speeches on the floor, those de-
bating did not invoke the name of any economist to support their
8 "It can control the market, raise or lower prices, as will best promote its selfish
interests, reduce prices in a particular locality and break down competition and advance
prices at will where competition does not exist. Its governing motive is to increase the
profits of the parties composing it." 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (remarks of Senator
Sherman). Senator Pugh noted the need to prevent combinations whose purpose is "to
limit production". 21 CONG. REC. 2558 (1890). Senator Morgan and Representative
Culberson, the representative in charge of the bill, both warned about the power to
control prices and the attendant consequences of accumulation of capital. 21 CONG.
REC. 2609 (1890) (remarks of Senator Morgan); 21 CONG. REc. 4089 (1890) (remarks
of Representative Culberson).
As to the Clayton Act, see D. MARTIN, MERGERs AND THE CLAYTON ACT 43-56
(1959). See generally S. REP. No. 698, 63rd Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1914). The purpose
is "to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies and monopolies in their incipiency and
before consummation." The 1950 Amendment to Section 7 was to prevent acquisition
when the power existed to move prices upward. H. REP. 1191, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. 4-5
(1949); S. REP. 1775, 81 Cong. 2d Seas. 7-9 (1950).
0 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (remarks of Senator Sherman). "A trust for certain
purposes, which may mean simply a combination of capital, may be a valuable thing to
the community and the country." 21 CoNG. REc. 2471 (1890) (remarks of Senator
Teller); 21 CONG. Rc. 2606 (1890) (remarks of Senator Stewart).
10 The colloquy between Senator Kenna 'and Senator Hoar is illustrative of this con-
cept. Senator Kenna: "Is it intended as the sections seem to indicate, that if any
individual engaged in trade between states - by his own skill or energy, by the propriety
of his conduct generally shall pursue his calling in such a way as to monopolize a trade,
his action shall be a crime under the Act?" Senator Hoar: "Monopoly is merely a
technical term which has a clear and legal signification, and it is this: It is a sole
engrossing to a man's self by means which prevent others from engaging in fair com-
petition with him." 21 CoNG. REc. 3151-52 (1890).
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positions, and much of the debate centered on tariff policy and the
constitutionality of the bill.11
It is easy for lawyers and judges to review a legislative history and
find quotations to substantiate their position, regardless of what it
may be. This writer believes that the draftsmen of the Sherman Act
and the original Clayton Act were practical men not advocating any
wild scheme of business regulation. It is submitted that Congress was
attempting to solve the problem of the abuses created by certain large
corporations which controlled substantial economic power in a specific
area. Relying upon the common law as it then existed, most congress-
men, in enacting the Sherman Act, believed they were merely codify-
ing and to some extent expanding the common law prohibitions
against unreasonable restraints of trade.12
The legislative history of the Sherman Act and the original Clayton
Act do not indicate that a market consisting of numerous small inde-
pendent entrepreneurs was favored. The statements of several of the
important proponents indicated a preoccupation with the practices and
with the possible adverse economic consequences which could flow from
the exercise of monopoly power. 13 After the enactment of both Acts
the courts were cast adrift without any clear guidelines with respect
to the application and scope of the legislation. As a result, the courts
have had to develop their own tests for evaluating the legality of business
activity under these sections.
B. The Market Structure Test.
Although the text of the pertinent antitrust law does not specify a
market structure test, the courts have engrafted upon the phrases "mo-
nopolization" and "substantially lessen competition" just such a test.
This market structure test takes many forms and it is primarily the ad-
judication of the legality of a firm's activities under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act by a quantitative mea-
surement of the economic power controlled by such a firm. On the
11 The Congressional debates, in this author's opinion, reveal a complete lack of
knowledge on the part of the participants as to any economic theory.
12 See note 10, supra; 21 CONG. REc. 2456-57 (1890) (remarks of Senator Sherman);
21 CONG. REC. 2558-59 (1890) (remarks of Senator Pugh).
13 Disturbing the social order, inequality of condition, higher prices, price fixing.
21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890) (remarks of Senator Sherman); TOULMIN, supra note 1,
at 23. As to the original Clayton Act, Section 7, see D. MARnN supra note 7, at 46,
and remarks of Senator Cummins regarding resort to government controls to fix prices.
51 CONG. REc. 14256 (1914). See generally 1950 Amendment to Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act.
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horizontal level, the market structure test scrutinizes the percentage of
the relevant sales market controlled by the defendant and the relative
strength of the defendant's competitors. In appraising the legality of
vertically integrated power, the quantitative amount of the foreclo-
sure of the defendant's rivals from a market is the primary test. Con-
glomerate or diversified economic power is found to violate the anti-
trust laws if the size of the organization can potentially be detrimental
to the competitors in a particular field.
The evolution of the market structure test is demonstrated by a
review of the application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to monopo-
lization. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, did not undergo
such an evolution but incorporated the market structure approach as
it had been developed by the courts under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
C. Development of the Market Structure Test Under Section 2
of the Sherman Act.
As indicated, Section 2 of the Sherman Act did not incorporate
a market structure test but rather introduced a new term to the vo-
cabulary of public control of business "monopolization". It was not
until the Supreme Court decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States'
4
that meaning was given to the term "monopolization". At this initial
stage, the Court did not define the term by means of a market struc-
ture approach. Rather, Justice White, unable to find a meaning for
the word at common law, resorted to analogizing "monopolization" to
the concept of monopoly at common law.15 The common law concept
of monopoly was conceived by Justice White to be those market situa-
tions wherein the defendants possessed a degree of economic power
and engaged in predatory practices which produced non-beneficial
economic results such as: 1) increased prices, 2) restriction of pro-
duction, 3) deterioration of quality, and 4) the elimination of com-
petitors.16 In other words, monopoly or "monopolization" was not
conceived to be a specific type of market but was interpreted as the
existence and exercise of economic power which generated non-bene-
ficial economic consequences. There was no condemnation of mo-
14 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
15 Id. at 51-52.
16 Id. at 52. Mr. Justice White was able to do this by observing that there was no
common law prohibition against the creation of a monopoly by an individual and that
tie statute omitted "any direct prohibition against monopoly in the concrete". Id.
91 4.
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nopoly power standing alone. The existence of abusive practices causing
non-beneficial economic consequences inferred the requisite of intent.17
The Supreme Court in subsequent cases'8 continued to apply this
analysis which can best be labeled as an abuse test. The discussions of
economic power in these cases centered on the amount of capital ac-
cumulated by the defendants rather than the percentage of a market
controlled by the defendants.' 9
To summarize, the Supreme Court decisions in Standard Oil,
20
American Tobacco Co. v. United States,2' Union Pacific Railroad Co.
v. United States22 and others, was primarily an "abuse" test empha-
sizing the element of intent. Upon non-beneficial economic conse-
quences and predatory practices the court would infer that the defend-
ant had an intent to monopolize. When this intent was combined
with substantial economic power, Section 2 of the Sherman Act had
been violated.
The abuse test continued as the primary method of determining the
legality of a firm's action under Section 2 until the decision of Learned
Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.23  This land-
mark decision shifted the emphasis from an abuse test to a market
structure test by manipulation of the concept of intent. Judge Hand
in Alcoa found that there was monopoly power by defining the total
market and then ascertaining the percentage of that market controlled
by the defendant.24 Judge Hand then stated that the defendant was
guilty of monopolization if its monopoly power was achieved by
17 Id. at 75.
18 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v.
United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1917); United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
226 U.S. 61 (1912).
19 For example, in Standard Oil, the opinion of Mr. Justice White merely enumerated
the companies controlled by Standard Oil and its share ownership of each. No total
asset figure was used. 221 U.S. 1, 71 n.1 (1911). A generalized statement was made
that "aggregating a so vast capital, gives rise, in and of itself, in the absence of counter-
vailing circumstances, to say the least, to the prima facie presumption of intent and
purpose to maintain dominance over the oil industry . . ." Id. at 25. In American
Tobacco the total output of the corporation in 1891 was stated. 221 U.S. 106, 159 n.1
(1911). The gradual accumulation of companies is detailed but an asset analysis or
market study is not undertaken.
20 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
21 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
22 226 U.S. 61 (1912).
23 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
24 Although the market was limited to virgin aluminum ingots, the effect of the
"secondary" aluminum was considered. Id. at 424-25. The court concluded that
Alcoa's control over the ingot market was reckoned to be over 90%. Id. at 425.
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maneuvers which, though "honestly industrial", were not economically
inevitable but were the results of conscious business choice.25 Intent
was derived from the mere existence of size,26 in the absence of proof
that the defendant had the power "thrust" upon him. The require-
ment of predatory practices or non-beneficial economic consequences
was eliminated. Evidence of reasonable profits or other beneficial
economic consequences was rejected by the court on the assumption
that "unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages
thrift and depresses energy."'27  To substantiate the condemnation of
size Judge Hand cited statements by Senator Sherman. 28  A review
of these statements indicates that they were taken out of context and
did not reflect the position of Senator Sherman as there were indi-
cations that the Senator conceived a monopoly not only in terms of size,
but also in terms of economic consequences. 29  The only other au-
thority which was cited to support this analysis was Judge Hand's
opinion in United States v. Corn Products Refining Co.30
The opinion by Judge Hand chanted the ritualistic liturgy that "mere
size" is not an offense against the Sherman Act but then proceeded to
"disregard any question of intent."31  The only intent necessary is a
general intent to maintain the economic power. In other words, any
conscious activity which does not decrease the market percentage con-
trolled infers general intent. By the elimination of a specific intent
to monopolize, there is no other requirement except a high degree of
market penetration which in itself a court construes as evidence of gen-
eral intent. In spite of the homage to the abuse test, a strict market
structure test was created.
Many experts believe that Alcoa has been approved by the United
25 "It was not inevitable that it should always anticipate increases in the demand
for ingot and be prepared to supply them. Nothing compelled it to keep doubling and
redoubling its capacity before others entered the field. It insists that it never excluded
competitors; but we can think of no more effective exclusion than progressively to
embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new
capacity already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of experience,
trade connections and the elite of personnel." Id. at 431.
26 Id. at 430-31.
27 Id. at 427. The lower court had found that Alcoa's profit upon capital invested
after the payment of income taxes had been only about 10%7. Even Judge Hand stated
that Aloca had not made exorbitant profits on ingot aluminum. Id. at 427-28.
28 Id. at 428-29 n.1, citing 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890), 21 CONG. REc. 2460
(1890), 21 CONG. Rac. 2598 (1890).
29 L.S. Lnvy & R. J. SAMPSON, AMEnicAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 494 (1962).
30 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
31 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).
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States Supreme Court.3 2  This concept of approval originated with
Judge Wyzanski's opinion in United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp.33 In that opinion, three different but cognate approaches are
recognized in determining whether a defendant has violated the mo-
nopolization provisions of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.3 4 First, the
"abuse" test is recognized. A second more inclusive approach is
identified with Justice Douglas's opinion in United States v. Griffith."
Judge Wyzanski interpreted that opinion as not requiring a showing of
a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act to prove a violation of Sec-
tion 2. If an enterprise has the power to exclude competition and has
exercised such power or intends to exercise this power, then Section 2 is
violated. Judge Wyzanski differentiates this approach from the abuse
test by stating that it is not necessary to have a technical restraint of trade
but merely to have effective control of a market to use or plan an exclu-
sionary practice. Judge Wyzanski construes Griffith as an endorse-
ment of Alcoa. The basis for this assumption rests in the use by
Justice Douglas of the terms "monopoly power" and "effective market
control".
3 6
Griffith states that the existence of power to exclude competition
is a violation of Section 2, "provided it is coupled with the pur-
pose or intent to exercise that power".3 7  Judge Wyzanski claims
not to rely on any distinction between the approach taken by Justice
Douglas in Griffith and the approach taken by Judge Hand in Alcoa
since he finds that the defendant had the requisite market strength and
that this strength excluded potential and limited actual competition.18
This departs from the test outlined in Griffith and is instead a whole-
hearted acceptance of the concepts advanced in Alcoa.
Regardless of the manner in which the market structure test be-
came the law of the land, recent Supreme Court decisions clearly
indicate that size is the only element necessary for a violation of
the monopolization provision of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. United
32 ABA ANTITRUST LAW SECTION, ANnTRusT DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968 at 35-36
(1968).
33 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
34 Id. at 342.
35 334 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1948).
36 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass.
1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100, 107 (1948).
37 Id.
38 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D. Mass. 1953).
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States v. Grinnell Corp.39 is clearly indicative of the Court's think-
ing. There, the existence of the necessary economic power was in-
ferred solely from the predominant share of the market.4 °0 Although
the Supreme Court seemed to require proof that economic power was
attained or acquired by means other than a superior product, business
acumen or historical accident, the majority opinion inferred monopolis-
tic intent from the conscious acquisition of the market share held by
the defendants. 41 The Court stated that this presented no problem "as
what was done in building the empire was done plainly and explicitly
for a single purpose. '42  There is no indication what that purpose was
but the majority opinion had outlined in simplified form the growth
of the four affiliated defendants. The only questionable activity en-
gaged in by the defendant involved certain territorial restrictions. Al-
though these activities were viewed as per se violations of Section 1,
that issue was not before the Court. Furthermore, there was no causal
relationship between the market controlled and the restrictive agree-
ments. The only conclusion that can be derived from this case is that
the market structure test is firmly engraved on the antitrust law.
The market structure theory of monopoly may initially seem more
attractive than the abuse theory since it strikes at the heart of monopoly
power rather than at its manifestations. It is a beguiling simplicity that
overlooks certain difficulties of the gravest consequences. Since the
market structure test incorporates only a requirement of a general intent,
the approach becomes dependent only upon the percentage of the market
controlled. The problem of market definition becomes all important.
The degree of judicial discretion which is permitted in the delineation
of the market gives rise to the possibility that it may be exercised in a
partisan manner. A brief digression may serve to illustrate this ob-
servation.
The decision of Judge Hand in Alcoa is of interest in examining the
manner in which he defined the market. The principal question dis-
cussed in that opinion was whether virgin aluminum and scrap aluminum
should be considered a single market. The court did not take into con-
sideration the competition afforded by other metals. By utilizing this
39 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
40 87% of the accredited central station service business. Id. at 571. The dissent
of Justice Fortas, with whom Justice Stewart joined, questioned the definition as being
tailored to the dimensions of the defendants. The relevant market was characterized as
a "strange, red-haired bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp classification". Id. at 591.
41 Id. at 576.
42 Id. at 571.
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very limited market, the court was able to find that the defendant con-
trolled over 90% of the virgin ingot production within a given geo-
graphical area.43 A more recent example of a distorted market analy-
sis is found in Grinnell. The government brought civil action claiming
monopolization of the accredited central stations service protection in-
dustry by four affiliated firms controlling 87% of that market. The
lower court rejected all the defendant's attempts to expand the market
by the use of economic data to present the effect of competition from
other forms of fire and burglary protection. The majority opinion did
not undertake any economic examination to substantiate the market defi-
nition which "fits neatly" the defendant's operations. Justice Fortas, dis-
senting, accurately noted that it is simple to find the requisite market
power when the trial court has "tailored the market" to fit the defend-
ants. Further, Justice Fortas felt the market definition accepted by the
majority was very strange indeed.
Such absurd market definitions are possible because the statute does
not incorporate any specific test of market delineation. The economi-
cally sound test advanced in United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co. (Celophane),44 which evaluated the cross-elasticity of the products
with substitutes, has not been followed in subsequent decisions by the
Supreme Court. Without a valid economic delineation of the relevant
market by accepted economic methods, the market structure test be-
comes an absurdity.
45
D. Market Structure Test Under Clayton Act, Section 7.
Section 7, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Bill of 1950,40 pro-
vides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or in-
directly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.47
To summarize the statute, it prohibits any acquisition or merger
which substantially lessens competition or tends to create a monopoly
43 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945).
44 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
45 See generally Note, The Market: A Concept In Anti-Trust, 54 COLuM. L. Rpy.
580 (1954).
46 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
47 Id.
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in any line of commerce. It is clear that Section 7 is not directed at
economic power accumulated by internal growth.48 Whatever the
legislative intent of the draftsmen, the statute has gained its meaning
from judicial decisions. It became quickly apparent that Section 7 em-
bodied a completely different set of standards than Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.
First, the standard by which the legality of acquisitions is to be
evaluated is whether the effect is to "substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly". This standard implies that the
statute is designed to arrest acts and practices in their incipiency be-
fore they could rise to the level of a violation of the Sherman Act.49
The first authoritative decision under the amended Section 7 was
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,50 wherein the government claimed
that the merger of the nation's eighth largest shoe manufacturer with
the third largest shoe manufacturer violated Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. The Justice Department's attack was on both the horizontal and
the vertical aspects of the merger. In declaring the challenged merger
to violate Section 7, Chief Justice Warren provided a comprehensive
exposition of the statute, ruling that each acquisition is unique and must
be evaluated in the context of the relevant market.51 Emphasis was
placed on the degree of concentration within the relevant market and
the recent trends within that market. The Court in Brown Shoe re-
jected consideration of the economic consequences of the merger, and
focused instead on the market structure for the determination of the
48 It is of historical interest to note that the study which gave rise to the 1950
amendment indicated that in the highly concentrated industries, few acquisitions were
undertaken. FTC, The Present Trend of Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions, S. Doc.
No. 17, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1947).
40 United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957). This
is clearly established by the legislative history. S. REP. No. 698, 63rd Cong. 2d Sess.
1 (1914) comments on the original Clayton Act:
Broadly stated, the bill, in its treatment of unlawful restraints and monopolies,
seeks to prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices which, as a rule,
singly and in themselves, are not covered by the Act of July 2, 1890, [the Sherman
Act], or other existing antitrust acts, and thus, by making practices illegal, to
arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies and monopolies in their incipiency and
before consummation.
For an excellent summary of the legislative history of Section 7, see D. MARTiN,
MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON AcT 221-53 (1959).
50 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
At the time of trial, Brown Shoe Co. operated thirty shoe factories and controlled
1230 retail outlets. It produced approximately 5% of all domestic shoes. The other
parties in the acquisition produced one-half of 1% of all shoes in the United States.
Kinney's over 400 retail outlets accounted for 1.2% of all shoe sales in the country in
dollar volume.
51 Id.
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legality-2 The amount of prohibited economic concentration is deemed
to be more than de minimus yet less than required to violate the Sher-
man Act.53 Intent to lessen competition was not held to be a pertinent
consideration.
5 4
The flexible interpretation of market structure propounded in the
Brown Shoe case, was abruptly and significantly altered in United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank. 5 Mr. Justice Brennan writing
for the majority promulgated a rule of presumptive illegality when
a merger or acquisition "produces a firm controlling an undue per-
centage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant in-
crease in the concentration of firms in that market. . ... 51 As a
result of this merger, the surviving entity would have approximately
thirty per cent of commercial banking business in the four county Phila-
delphia metropolitan area. The Supreme Court refused to specify the
smallest market share that would be deemed to threaten competition.57
The rationale of the Philadelphia National Bank case was followed
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa-Rome Cable) 8
and United States v. Continental Can Co.0 In both, slight increases
in concentration in already concentrated industries was held to be un-
lawful without extended analysis.60 These mergers would have re-
sulted in combined market shares of 29 percent and 25 percent. Both
of these industries were characterized by increasing concentration.
The coup' de grace to the market structure test under Section 7
was delivered by the Supreme Court in United States v. Von's Grocery
52 No detailed analysis will be attempted of the vertical aspects of Brown Shoe, and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. There is a difference between horizontal and vertical
power. The horizontal control is primarily a power over price, whereas vertical power
is evaluated in terms of foreclosure. See Blackford, Vertical Acquisitions and Section 7
of the Clayton Act, W. REs. L. REv. 102 (1965).
53 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328-29 (1962).
54 The only "psychoanalysis" of the parties was as to their business purposes mo-
tivating the merger. Evidently, this was done to permit acquisitions of firms in
financial difficulty. Id. at 331.
55 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
56 Id. at 363.
57 Id. at 364.
58 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
59 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
60 In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa-Rome Cable), 377 U.S.
271 (1964), Alcoa had 27.8% of the relevant market and Rome Cable accounted for
only 1.3% of the same market. Although Rome Cable was small percentagewise, it
ranked ninth among all companies and fourth among independents in the aluminum
conductor market. Id. at 280-81. Similarly, in United States v. Continental Can Co.,
378 U.S. 441 (1964), Continental Can had 21.9% of relevant market, ranking second
in the industry, and Hazel-Atlas ranked sixth in the market with 3.1%. id. at 461.
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Co."' Von's, the third largest food chain in the Los Angeles area, ac-
quired the sixth largest chain in the same market. When combined, the
sales of the new firm would be the second largest in the area. In the
thirteen years prior to the Court's decision, the number of single store
operators had decreased by over 40 percent while the number of chains
had increased substantially. 2 These facts furnished sufficient basis for
the conclusion that the merger violated Section 7.63
The reasoning that runs through the Supreme Court decisions from
Philadelphia National Bank to Von's Grocery is that Section 7 was de-
signed to prevent economic concentration by keeping a large number
of small competitors in business.0 4  The majority in Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank asserted that such a view was fully consonant with eco-
nomic theory, stating, "'competition is likely to be greatest when there
are many sellers, none of which has any significant market
share. . . .' "6 If this test were to be accepted in toto, then any merger
or acquisition on the horizontal level would be illegal in that it re-
duces the number of competitors. 60  There has been an evolution from
a preservation of competition to a prohibition against economic con-
centration within a line of commerce.
E. Guidelines of the Enforcement Agencies.
The market structure test has become the keystone of the efforts of
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in their
enforcement procedures. On May 30, 1968, the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice outlined its standards for determining
whether to oppose corporate acquisition under Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act.67  Though these guidelines are not binding on the Depart-
ment of Justice, the purpose was to inform the public of the enforce-
ment procedures. The guidelines separate the types of acquisitions
61 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
62 Id. at 272-73.
63 Id. at 274.
64 Id. at 275; United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963).
O5 374 U.S. at 363-65 quoting Comment, "Substantially to Lessen Competition . .
Current Problems of Horizontal Mergers, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1638-39 (1959).
66 This possibility has been noted by more than one writer. See Handler, Some Mis-
adventures in Antitrust Policymaking-Nineteenth Annual Review, 76 YALE L.L 92,
103 (1966); Solomon, Why Uncle Sam Can't Lose a Case Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 53 A.B.A.J. 137 (1967); Speech by ROBERT A. BIcKs, Acquisition and
Mergers, before the First Annual Antitrust Institute, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Nov. 5,
1965.
67 Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines, 1 T tDE REG. REP. f 4430 (1968).
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into three categories-horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. In the
horizontal acquisition, there are sub-categories of highly"8 and less
highly concentrated markets, 9 and markets with a trend toward con-
centration. The percentage share of each participant in the acquisition
is the sole criterion of the Department of Justice policy. 70 It is merely
enough that a given market share exists. 71  There is no inquiry as to the
intent of the parties, nor any analysis of the industry, nor any evaluation
as to the economic consequences of the combination.
The Federal Trade Commission has been issuing guidelines in spe-
cific industries, e.g., vertical acquisitions in the ready mix concrete
and cement industries, 72 food distribution industries, 73 product ex-
tension mergers in grocery products manufacturing, 74 and textile mill
products industries. 75  All of these guidelines have as their basis a
market percentage or a fixed dollar amount in size. Although the Fed-
eral Trade Commission guidelines recognize the characteristics of an
industry, the market structure test still predominates. In addition, to
the industry guidelines, the Federal Trade Commission uses its investi-
gative powers to monitor acquisition activity.
On April 8, 1969, the Federal Trade Commission issued a resolu-
08 Where the shares of the four largest firms amount to 75% or more of the
market, the following acquisitions will be challenged:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
4% 1o or more
10% 2% or more
15% or more 1% or moreId. at 6683.
09 Where the shares of the four largest firms amount to less than 75% of the
market, the following acquisitions will be challenged:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm
5% 5% or more
10% 4% or more
15% 3% or more
20% 2% or more
259o or more 1% or more
Id. at 6684.
70 There is some recognition of the failing firm doctrine and the possible advantages
of economics of scale. Id. at 6684-85.
71 In vertical situations, if a supplying firm has 10% or more of the market and
one or more of the purchasing firms, accounting in tote for approximately 6% of the
total purchases, an acquisition will be challenged unless there are no barriers to entry.
Conglomerate acquisitions involving potential entrants or where there exists the danger
of reciprocal buying are again evaluated in percentages. Id. at 6686-89.
72 CEMENT INDUSTRY-VERTICAL MERGERS, Id. 4510, at 6801-04,
73 FOOD DISTRIBUTION INDUSTRIES, Id. 1 4520, at 6804-08.
74 GROCERY PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING-PRODUCT EXTENSION MERGERS, id. f 4530,
at 6808-13.
75 TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS INDUSTRIES, id. 1 4540, at 6814-28.
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tion suggesting that firms undertaking large corporate mergers or ac-
quisitions be required to notify the Commission and furnish special
reports76 within ten days after any agreement in principle is reached
and no less than sixty days77 prior to the consummation of the transac-
tion.7 8 This notification program applies to those firms subject to the
FTC jurisdiction, and having assets of 10 million dollars or more, plus
combined assets of 250 million dollars. The reports filed with the
FTC are public information and are shared with the Department of
Justice.
II. ANTITRUST CONCEPTS
The preceding legal analysis is not, nor was it intended to be,
definitive. The purpose of the foregoing was to reduce to a relatively
elementary level the substantive provisions of the antitrust laws. It is
hoped that this simplification will expose the paradoxes and miscon-
ceptions that abound in this legal morass. It is imperative to look at
the present state of the antitrust laws without any preconceived con-
clusions and at a distance from the factual circumstances of the cases.
The following are the emerging trends and problems which are evi-
dent from the foregoing analysis.
First, without an accurate finding as to the relevant market, there
can be no way of determining whether the defendants have the requi-
site degree of market power. A "tailor made" delineation of the market,
such as in the Grinnell case, can be utilized to hold any substantial firm
guilty of monopolization or to prevent any external growth of such
firm. As a practical matter, any distortion in the market definition
creates a concurrent distortion in the analysis of market power. The
reason for this restrictive market interpretation has been the failure
of the courts to heed their own pronouncements that the boundaries of
the relevant market be determined in accordance with economic con-
cepts. To obtain an accurate picture, the impact of actual and po-
tential substitute products must be considered. In addition, rational
geographic limits must be outlined.
It should be noted that different markets are specified in the two anti-
trust statutes. The "line of commerce" phrase of the Clayton Act is a
70 F.T.C. MERGER NoTiFIcAnoN PROGRAM, Id. 114455, at 6702-06.
77 MERGER NOTIFICATION REPORT FORM, Id. 4455.10, at 6705-07.
78 ".... as promptly as possible." Letter from FTC Chmn. Dixon in answer to
letter on behalf of Trade Reg. Comm., N.Y.C.B.A., released July 16, 1969, in Trade
Reg. Rep. 1 4455.20, at 6706 (1969).
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narrower market definition than specified market under the Sherman
Act. In practice, both are manipulated to achieve the desired results but
in theory they are different. Why should there be any difference?
Perhaps it is time to reconsider these circumscribed market definitions
in favor of one more in accord with economic realities.
Second, at the present time, there is no statutory prohibition against
being a monopoly. Judicial decisions have engrafted their own prohi-
bitions against economic power which are tantamount to declaring
monopoly per se illegal. Perhaps, it is time to reconsider the origin of
monopolization. The early cases clearly indicated that it was not the
power of the firm that was tainted but the results from the use of
that power. In Standard Oil and American Tobacco, competitors
were excluded and prices were increased-all results of the exercise of
of economic power. Gradually, a shift in reasoning occurred. No
longer was an evaluation made of the results, but attention was focused
on the power of a firm within a specific market and the intent of the
possessor of such power. Similarly, under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
recent cases indicate a prohibition against the rise of any economic
power at its incipiency. Under all three of the statutory provisions
previously discussed, the present basis of the illegal taint is quantitative
control, not the effects or the results of such dominion. Regardless of
judicial protestations to the contrary, size is now the determinative ele-
ment of legality under our antitrust laws.
Third, some legislators and judges have not been cognizant of the
basic distinctions among the different forms in which economic power
may exist. On the same level of industrial organization (horizontal),
the effects of such power are apparent on that level by increased prices,
product deterioration or by exclusion of competitors. The competi-
tive effects of vertical power (several integrated tiers of industrial or-
ganization) are not so readily discernible. The legality of vertical power
or vertical integration is normally evaluated in terms of foreclosure. In
other words, competition on all levels is limited if the competitors
on each level are foreclosed from a segment of the market which
would otherwise be open to them. Unless size is utilized as the sole
criterion of legality in vertical situations, there would be extreme diffi-
culty in calculating the effects of vertical power. Similarly, can the
tests of legality applied to horizontal and vertical situations be used
to adjudicate conglomerate economic power? Not only is it time
to examine the concepts of size and foreclosure as the basis for le-
[Vol. 3
COALESCENCE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
gality but also to apply the right test to the appropriate economic
power.
Fourth, the key to many of the problems that plague government
control of business is preconceived concepts of economic competition
held by policymakers. For example, it is abundantly clear that many
legislators view economic competition as requiring a market consist-
ing of many sellers each of whom possess little power. Recent ju-
dicial opinions indicate that such a market represents the ideal to be
copied. It is assumed that in such an environment, the competitive
pressures will lower prices, improve the product quality and accelerate
technological innovations. It is time to re-examine not only the goals
of antitrust policy but also the institutional economic structure that can
best achieve desired results. The following review of the develop-
ment of economic theory sheds some light on this problem.
Ill. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
Compared to the study of law, economics is a relatively new disci-
pline. The early economic writings of Adam Smith, Ricardo and Mat-
thews were devoted to observations of the existing market place. It
was not until the late nineteenth century that attempts were made to
develop a systematic body of economic thought. The most highly
developed of these schools of thought was the neo-classical micro-
economic theory. It is this early economic theory that furnishes the
justification for the market structure test applied by the courts.
A. Neo-Classical Economics.
Neo-classical economics is the school of economic thought which
distilled a mixture of the ideas of Adam Smith, Ricardo and Mill into a
comprehensive system of price and quantity determination. Neo-classi-
cal economics was the forerunner of the present day mathematical
economics (econometrics) which attempts to reduce the business world
to a mathematical model. This school of thought had many spokes-
men, such as W. S. Jevons"9, Philip Wickstead, Karl Menger, Frederick
von Wieser, J. B. Clark and Leon Walras, but the outstanding author-
ity was considered to be Alfred Marshall.80 The neo-classical econo-
mists sought to create a series of models which could produce pre-
"t) W. JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (4th ed. 1911).
80 A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (8th ed. 1922).
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dictable mathematical results.81 This mathematical approach was tem-
pered by the inclusion of subjective psychological variables. By com-
bining certain of the fundamental assumptions of economics and psy-
chology, the neo-classical economists sought to fuse supply and demand
into a mechanism for determining a price equilibrium. To show the
interaction of supply and demand in different situations, models were
devised. These models reflect different market structures and form
the basis upon which policymakers and the courts rationalize the so-
called market structure test. The following paragraphs attempt to
show the theoretical basis of individual market structures.
Pure Competition. The essence of pure competition is that no single
buyer or seller has enough power within the market to have any appre-
ciable influence over price. The model is characterized by numerous
sellers, each acting independently, with complete freedom of market
entry. The pure competition model is based on several assumptions:
1) perfect knowledge of all firms in the market as to supply, demand
and relevant prices; 2) each individual within the riarket acts ra-
tionally; and 3) the goods produced by each firm are identical. In
such a situation, the demand curve for the product of each individual
firm is infinitely elastic."2 Total revenue for each firm will increase
with each additional product sold. The firm will operate at that point
where it maximizes its profit. This optimum point is related directly
to the cost structure of the firm. Since the individual firm has no
control over the price, the price will be determined by the entire de-
mand for the product. The price of the product in a perfect competi-
tion is the result of the meeting of the total demand curve for the
entire industry and the available supply.
In a purely competitive market, certain economic results are supposed
to flow naturally. First, in the long run, the optimum allocation of re-
sources is achieved. The inefficient firms having a high cost structure
are eliminated. Assuming that the entire economy is purely competi-
tive, the industry will be judged by the public demand. Second, the
price for the product is the lowest possible, as a firm will produce up to
its break-even point. This is due to the close relation of costs to
81 FERGUSON, LANDMARKS OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 175-91 (1950); 0. TAYLOR, A
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 310-36 (1960).
82 The elasticity of a demand curve is the degree to which an increase in the quantity
sold affects the price. If the total revenue of a firm goes up when price is reduced, then
the demand is deemed elastic. On the other hand, if total revenue goes down when the
price is decreased, the demand is inelastic.
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prices. If the individual firm raises its price, its sales would drop to
zero as business goes elsewhere. Third, this competitive process is pre-
sumed to furnish the proper climate for optimum technological prog-
ress.
83
Monopoly. As opposed to pure competition, monopoly is the ability
of a firm to control price and to control entry into the field.8 4 The
general conditions for a theoretical monopoly include: 1) an absence of
close substitutes; 2) a means of excluding actual and potential entrants
(such as a patent, control of supply, etc.);'5 and 3) locational advan-
tages. There are few long run monopolies in the United States except
those that are granted by the government, such as public utilities. Nor-
mally, a short run monopoly can be attained by a technological advance
or entry into a market that can support only one firm. These short run
monopolies are eroded by obsolescence or by increased demand. The
neo-classical marginal analysis of the firm can be very helpful in
evaluating the theoretical reasons why so many have condemned a
monopolistic market structure.
The demand curve facing for a monopoly is the same as it is for
the entire industry under pure competition. In a monopoly situation, the
demand curve also represents the average price received for the product.
The price that the monopolists will charge is that which maximizes total
profit. The point at which the monopolist will operate (i.e., where his
total profit will be the greatest) will be where marginal revenue is
equal to marginal cost. Marginal revenue is the addition to total reve-
nue derived from the sale of one additional unit. The marginal revenue
curve is downward, because as a monopolist increases his sales, a lower
price must be accepted, thus lowering the price on all previous units.
Marginal cost is the increase in total cost consequent to the production
of one additional unit. It is a "U" shaped curve for the same reasons
as the average total cost curve.
Unfortunately, for the real monopolist, the theoretical model is
based upon an assumption of perfect knowledge as to demand and
costs. It must also be remembered that the neo-classical concept is a
83 See generally, J. BAIN, PRICING, DISTRIBuTION AND EMPLOYMENT 130-51 (1953);
M. BOBER, INTERMEDIATE PRICE AND INCOME THEORY 203-35 (1962); F. MACHLUP, THE
ECONOMICS OF SELLER'S COMPETITION (1952); P. SAmUELSON, ECONOMCCs 441-50 (3rd
ed. 1955).
84 A. MARSHALL, supra note 80, at 477-95; G. BACH, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO ANALYSIS AND POLICY 453-62 (5th ed. 1966); A. BuRNs, AND OTHERS, MODERN
ECONOMICS 346-50 (1948).
85 M. BOBER, supra note 83, at 237-38.
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long term model and assumes immunity from technology, obsolescence
and competitors attracted by high profits.
The results of this theoretical monopoly should be noted. First,
there is no question that, in a theoretical sense, prices will be higher in
a monopoly situation than in pure competition. Second, some assert
that the profit element extorted by the monopoly misallocates the re-
sources of the entire economy. If all other sectors of the economy
were theoretical monopolies, then perfect competition would prevail
among these sectors.
The mechanism of the neo-classical model for monopoly contains
no inherent requirement that the product quality deteriorate in monopoly
situations. Similarly, there is no theoretical reason why technological
innovation will progress faster in pure competition than in a mo-
nopoly. It is only an assumption that the competitive process stimu-
lates innovation.
B. Monopolistic Competition.
Although the neo-classical economists recognized the existence of
imperfect competition, (a blending of competition and monopoly), it
remained for Professors Edward Chamberlain"" and Joan Robinson 7 to
endow monopolistic competition with special characteristics. The con-
cepts advanced by Chamberlin and Robinson represented an attempt
to construct a theoretical model that corresponded to business realities.
This was a sharp break from the neo-classical approach which pre-
dicted economic results from a set of preordained economic conditions.
The Chamberlin hypothesis did not accept many of the psychologi-
cal assumptions of the neo-classical economists. Chamberlain assumed
a market with a few sellers of a standard product. These sellers have
identical demand and cost curves,-both of which are known to the
sellers. Unlike the firms in perfect competition, the sellers in mo-
nopolistic competition will take account of the price consequences of
their actions. There is a tendency for the sellers to behave like monopo-
lists without conspiring (e.g., price leadership). This is the key distinc-
tion from the neo-classical psychological theory which assumed each
seller would pursue his own self interest. The second part of the
Chamberlin thesis was that rivalry among producers of differentiated
goods eliminated any monopoly profits. This rivalry does not mini-
86 E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933).
87 J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETTON (1933). It should be
noted that Robinson's theory differs from Chamberlin's in details of logic, but the con-
clusions reached are essentially the same.
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mize costs. 88  The concepts of monopolistic competition advanced by
Chamberlin and Robinson gradually became accepted by most econo-
mists as an extention of the neo-classical doctrine.
8 9
C. Destructive Competition.
In the early 1940's, Professor J. A. Schumter's book, Capitalism,
Socialism and Democracy,90 offered a fundamentally different approach
to the issue of industrial concentration. Schumter assumed that oligo-
polistic firms possessing economic power would behave, not like mo-
nopolists as theorized by Chamberlin, but as competitors. His theory
was that demands of business would require large size firms. These
firms would concentrate their competitive energies and resources on
technological progress. As technology advances, certain industries
decline and others prosper, at least until a new development reduces the
profitability of the industry. The costs of innovation are so great that
sufficient market control is needed for the appropriate reward. This
concept has been termed "destructive competition". Not only did it
assume that the monopolists would compete among themselves, but
that all profits would be short run due to technological advancements.
To maintain its position, a monopoly would increase costs (reducing
profit) to increase its research for new products. This hypothesis was
widely debated at the time and the dispute continues to this day.
D. Workable or Effective Competition.
As the adherence to the neo-classical market structure approach was
being questioned, others were attempting to develop an alternative the-
oretical concept of competition. Professor J. M. Clark was the first
to outline the characteristics of a so-called "workable competition" in an
article in the American Economic Review.9 It listed numerous cri-
teria for market structure and performance to evaluate a given industry.
Although economic consequences in terms of prices, innovation and
allocation of resources, are considered, there is still an analysis of the
market.
88 G. STOCKING, WORKABLE COMPETITION AND ANTITRUSTPOLiCY 120 (1961).
89 The foregoing outline of Chamberlin's thesis is elementary. The reader is directed
to the cited work for comprehensive treatment, E. CHAMBERIN, supra note 86. The
acceptance of different psychological interpretations of business conduct has been one
of the strengths of the neo-classical school. It has enabled the models to be constantly
modified in accordance with new theories of business behavior.
90 J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (Ist ed. 1942).
91 Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV., 241
(1946).
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There have been numerous economists92 who have elaborated upon
and refined the criteria originally proposed by Professor Clark. Re-
gardless of the denomination of the concepts of "workable competi-
tion" or "effective competition", they were an analyzation of the mar-
ket structure test and the market performance test.93 All sought to
evaluate a given market in terms of the possible alternatives and the
economic consequences of the degrees of concentration. The members
of the antitrust bar are probably most familiar with the synopsis of
workable competition presented in the 1955 edition of the Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. 94 The ba-
sic characteristic of workable competition, according to the report is
"that no one seller, and no group of sellers acting in concert, has the
power to choose its level of profits by giving less and charging more"."6
Further, the report states, "where there is workable competition ....
the individual seller cannot control his competitor's offerings, and those
offerings narrow the individual firm's discretion as to price and produc-
tion."96 There are several factors which according to the report iden-
tify workable competition:
(1) Number of effective competitive sellers: Relative size of com-
petitors.
(2) Opportunity for entry.
(3) Independence of rivals.
(4) Predatory preclusive practice.
(5) Rate of growth of the industry or market.
(6) Character of market incentives to competitive moves.
(7) Product differentiation and product homogeneity,
(8) Meeting or matching the prices of rivals.
(9) Excess capacity.
(10) Price discrimination.97
It is obvious that this is basically a market structure case which is a
refinement of the monopolistic competition theory. Although alter-
natives are considered, by definition there must be several com-
92 J. DIRLAm & A. KAN, FAr COMPETITION-THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTI-
TRusT PoLIcY (1954); Markham, Alternative Approach to Workable Competition, 40
Am. EcoN. REv. 349 (1950); E. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MO-
NOPOLY PROBLEM (1957).
93 The one exception is the work of Prof. Stocking, supra note 88. He placed the
emphasis on market performance and relegated market structure to the role of an
analytic tool.
94 ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. (1955).
95 Id. at 320.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 324-36.
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petitors in the market.
E. Economic Consequences.
The classical economists have generally agreed that adverse economic
consequences will result from a concentrated market structure. Re-
cent studies have, however, raised serious doubts as to the validity
of the assumption that the results of an oligopolistic or oligoponistic
market structure is not economically beneficial.
Innovation. Several recent studies have found that the large cor-
poration and some degree of market power appear to be a concomi-
tant of organized innovative efforts. 98 One study utilized the number
of patent applications to demonstrate that inventive output varies with
the firm's sales, but at less than a proportional rate.99 Several other
economists have undertaken similar studies and analyses, but have
reached different conclusions. 100 Another study has decried past at-
tempts and has advocated an empirical analysis of the antitrust laws
and growth and innovation. 1' 1 After reviewing the economic evi-
dence, this writer cannot accept the concept that a fragmentated mar-
ket structure will always lead to greater innovation than a concentrated
market.
Distribution of income. It has long been one of the tenets of many
socialist theoreticians that big business uses its economic power to
extort part of the profit from its workers. A relatively recent authori-
tative study established that higher wages are paid to workers in con-
centrated industries than in more competitive areas.102 Specific sta-
08 Mansfield, Size of Firm, Market Structure and Innovation, 71 J. POL. ECON. 556
(1963); Markham, Market Structure, Business Conduct and Innovation, 55 AM. ECON.
Ruv. 323 (1965). The Mansfield study seems to indicate that the largest firms do not
always introduce a disproportionately large share of innovations. Large firms account
for a relatively large share of innovation where there must be a large investment pro-
portionate to competition and the minimum size of the firm required to utilize the
technology was relatively large. Mansfield, supra at 573-74.
99 Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of Patented
Inventions, 55 AM. ECON. REv. 1097 (1965). The study also noted: "differences
in technological opportunity . . . are a major factor responsible for inter-industry dif-
ferences in inventive output. . .. Inventive output does not appear to be systematically
related to variations in market power, prior profitability, liquidity, or . . . product
diversification." Id. at 1121.
100 Fellner, The Influence of Market Structure and Technological Progress, 55 Q.J.
EcoN. 556 (1951); Hamberg, Size of Firm, Oligopoly and Research: The Evidence, 30
CAN. I. ECON. AND POL. Sci. 62 (1964).
101 Massel, Antitrust & Patent Laws: Effects on Innovation, 56 AM. EcoN. REV.,
Papers and Proceedings of the seventy-eighth annual meeting of the Am. Econ. Assoc.,
Dec. 28-30, 1965 at 284 (pub. bound 1966).
102 Weiss, Concentration and Labor Earnings, 56 AM. EcoN. RFv. 96, 114-15
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tistical analysis is used to show the higher wage scale in various con-
centrated industries such as steel and automobiles.
Higher prices. Extensive research is being conducted to ascertain
the degree to which profits correspond to market power. The indi-
cations are that a firm with economic power does not always exercise
such power to obtain maximum profits out of fear of attracting com-
petitors. 103 Modem trends toward product differentiation, advertising
and trade agreements have obscured any competitive price analysis.1"4
The fact is that there has been an absence of research to show a causal
relationship between economic power and higher prices.' 03 Too of-
ten, it has been mistakenly assumed that higher profits in concentrated
industries were indications of higher prices. This is exactly the fallacy
underlying the report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust
Policy favoring stricter legislation for concentrated industries. 100 The
Report stated that there was an impressive body of economic evidence
to show the adverse effects of industry concentration on product
priceslo' More research and analysis is necessary before this writer
(1966). In this writer's opinion, this study presents an example of the effective use
of statistical studies to substantiate a conclusion.
103 J. BAIN, BARRIERs TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES
zN MANUFACTURING INDusTIu s (1956).
104 Rothschild, Price Theory and Oligopoly, 57 EcoN. J. 299 (1947).
105 The recent articles includes Stern & Morgenroth, Concentration, Mutually
Recognized Interdependence and the Allocation of Marketing Resources, 41 J. OF Bus.
56 (1968); Dixon, Price Wars in Oligopoly: A Case of Goal Divergence, 26 UNIV. OF
WASH. Bus. REv. 17 (1967).
100 REPORT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY (1968)
("THE NEAL REPORT"); Hearings on the Role of Giant Corporations Before the Sub-
comm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 91st Cong.
1st Sess., Pt. 1A, App. IX, 877-905.
107 The author wrote directly to Dean Phil C. Neal, University of Chicago School
of Law, Chairman of the Task Force, supra note 106, to inquire as to this impressive
body of economic evidence. Mr. S. Paul Posner, the Staff Director of the project,
replied in a letter dated June 16, 1969:
Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manu-
facturing, 1936-1940, Quarterly Journal of Economics 298 (1951);
Collins, & Preston, Industry Structure and Price-Cost Margins, presented at
Antitrust Policy Seminar, Graduate School of Business Administration, University
of California, Los Angeles (mimeographed March 1968);
Comanor & Wilson, Market Structure, Advertising, and Market Performance:
An Empirical Analysis, presented at the Econometric Society Meetings (mimeo-
graphed, December 1965);
Mann, Seller Concentration, Barriers to Entry and Rates of Return in Thirty
Industries, 1950-1960, Review of Economics and Statistics 296 (1966);
Miller, Marginal Concentration Ratios and Industrial Profit Rates: Some
Empirical Results of Oligopoly Behavior, 34 Southern Economic Journal (1968);
and
Weiss, Average Concentration Ratios and Industrial Performance, Journal of
Industrial Economics 237 (1963).
After checking al of the articles which were published, this writer must question
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will be convinced of the prevailing assumption that there is a direct
relationship between market structure and price.
Allocation of resources. There is an absence of empirical evidence
which demonstrates that a fragmentated market will allocate the
nation's resources more effectively and accurately than an oligopolistic
or monopolistic market. The economies of scale in certain industries
necessitate large enterprises. It has also been questioned whether there
is a point where diseconomies of scale actually begin.1
0 8
The existing body of economic knowledge based on research and
analysis concerning the consequences of market concentration is rather
small. Most of the work has been based on theory rather than hard
facts. If additional research is to be undertaken, it is necessary that
the business world be placed in proper perspective.
IV. THE BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE
Unfortunately, antitrust policy cannot be formulated in a vacuum.
The businessman must make his decisions in a set of circumstances
and in the midst of countervailing pressures not contemplated by the
neo-classical economists. These factors must be considered and be
evaluated in devising an appropriate means of controlling business.
First, the markets for products are no longer subject to regional
limitations, but span the globe. These markets are calculated in terms
of millions of dollars. The character of the domestic market has shifted
to a consumer orientation. The foreign markets are also accessible to
American firms. All of these markets require tremendous amounts of
financial and technical resources.
In the United States, the existing market structures in key industries
are highly concentrated. Not only are there few firms in the relevant
market, but these firms have tremendous assets and invested capital,
technical skill, manpower, established lines of supply, production and
distribution. A recent Federal Trade Commission report indicates
that this concentration is increasing at a rapid rate.109 There can be no
question that bigness is a characteristic of American business. 110 The
whether these articles actually show a relationship of concentration and price. The
articles primarily deal with the relation of profit to market structure.
108 Diwan, Alternative Specification of Economies of Scale, 33 ECONOMcA 442
(1966).
109 Hearings on S.R. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 8A (1969) (Staff Report
of the FTC, Economic Report on Corporate Mergers).
110 REPORT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note
106, at 883.
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present antitrust policy actually protects entrenched economic power.
The emphasis on preventing the concentration of economic power in its
incipiency by the application of Section 7 of the Clayton Act serves to
give existing large firms a competitive advantage. In addition to the
present concentration in American business, there is a growing threat of
competition from foreign firms.
The twentieth century has witnessed the development of interna-
tional cartels in the formation of multi-nation economic trading blocs.
Advances in transportation and distribution methods have created a
world market. Not only are American firms competing in foreign
markets, but they are also faced with competition from foreign manu-
facturers in the United States-once a closed market. The rise in the
importation of small automobiles has become a major factor in the au-
tomobile market. No longer can the United States be considered "safe"
for American firms. From an international perspective, the develop-
ment of American business organizations as strong industrial com-
petitors is a prerequisite for national survival in the world market.
One wonders whether a small firm with limited assets can hope to
effectively compete with foreign competitors.
In addition to competitors in the marketplace, the individual firms
must operate in an environment of countervailing powers. Those
groups having countervailing power, by their action, force firms to
adopt business policies requiring accumulation of economic power and
expansion of these markets.
Concurrent with the rise of big business, organized labor has de-
veloped into an economic factor through gains won at the bargaining
table and through legislation. Since labor is a substantial factor in the
costs of most industrial operations, labor organizations present a coun-
tervailing power that must be considered in any major business deci-
sion. In some industries, where a market is totally fragmented,
unions have become the dominant force in the industry and control
many business decisions. The garment industry in New York is a
prime example.
Finally, the business firm must operate in the shadow of the largest
economic giant in the world-the United States Government. Because
of vast government operations and because of the scope of federal
power, conflicting policies toward the size of business firms have de-
veloped. While the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department is
busily attacking conglomerates and monopolies, other departments of
the government are pursuing policies which actually encourage bigness
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in business. A brief review identifies some of the conflicting policies
that encourage economic concentration.
Government procurement policies. Increasingly, the government is
turning to "big" business to assist in accomplishing its programs. Tra-
ditionally, large corporations have coordinated and furnished most of
the country's defense needs. Recently, even welfare programs, such
as job-training, have been subcontracted to the industrial giants. Ap-
parently there are certain departments that believe that only the large
firm has the physical and technical capability to handle certain tasks.
Tax policies. The Internal Revenue Code contains several provi-
sions which prevent small corporations from growing larger and thus
protects economic concentration. For example, one of the key sources
of capital for any firm is internally generated funds. Section 531111 of
the Internal Revenue Code levies a surtax on corporations which fail
to distribute as a dividend a reasonable portion of corporate earnings.
While this would appear to apply to all corporations, the tax is im-
posed on only those corporations which retain earnings for the purpose
of avoiding the income tax on shareholders. Such an illicit intent can
only be inferred in a closely held corporation and is not present in the
larger publicly held enterprises. There are numerous other instances in
the Internal Revenue Code where larger corporations obtain an advan-
tage over their smaller competitors.
Securities regulations. In the field of securities regulations, the 1964
amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, complicated the
life of many smaller corporations." 2 As a result, all corporations, not
exempted, with a minimum of 500 shareholders and assets in excess
of one million dollars are required to file a registration form with the
Securities and Exchange Commission." 3 Not only are they required to
file or register their securities, but they also become subject to the proxy
regulations of the SEC.' 4 This has meant that many smaller com-
panies have been forced to expend large sums relative to their size in
the preparation of forms and documents.
Monetary policy. In the recent period of tight money, the main
business victims have been the smaller firms. Larger firms with sub-
stantial economic power have access to bank loans at prime rates. In
addition, the larger firms have greater power to generate internal
ll 26 U.S.C. § 531 (1964).
112 See 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1954).
113 15 U.S.C. § 78(1) (1964).
114 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1964).
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funds by forcing quicker payments out of their customers and delaying
payments to suppliers.
There are many more instances of government policies which are
inconsistent with the efforts of the Justice Department to prevent con-
centration. The important lesson to be learned from these contradic-
tory policies is that antitrust legislation cannot, and does not, exist
within a vacuum. In this writer's opinion, the antitrust law must be
in accord and in harmony with the total framework of the social con-
trol of business. The antitrust policy must integrate law and econo-
mics in a pragmatic manner.
V. THE COALESCENCE OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND REALITY
The model of pure competition as devised by the neo-classical
economists bears no relation to existing market structures. There is
absolutely no way for the government to fragmentize the economy to
obtain a state of pure competition. Any such attempt would result in
a fantastic dislocation of resources. An example of the calamitous
economic consequences can be seen in the Red Chinese attempts to
shift the peasant from a form of controlled free market activity to total
communal life.
Regardless of its philosophical appeal, the myth of pure competition
cannot be adopted as a guide to the social control of an economy al-
ready endowed with entrenched, and seemingly inevitable, economic
power. Policymakers must look anew for a practical means to regu-
late business. It is the opinion of this writer that new legislation is
necessary to create a standard which will encourage economically bene-
ficial results. The following is the suggested basis for such a revision.
The most important lesson that can be learned from the foregoing
discussion of the recent economic theories is that the size of a firm and
the degree of economic power possessed by a firm should not be held
to be an evil per se. It is suggested that the economic power of an
oligopoly or oligopsony might be necessary for maximum production
and minimum prices. It is this author's hypothesis that the market
power of a firm is not a proper or accurate standard for evaluating the
economic worth or the social value of the firm. The accumulation or
acquisition of corporate assets should not be condemned unless the re-
sulting social and economic consequences are not beneficial.
The sole criterion of the social worth or the legality of any economic
unit should be the effects of the use of the economic power possessed
by that unit. It is here the role of the economist becomes crucial. The
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economists have the necessary tools to analyze the pertinent statistical
data to ascertain in a particular industry the economic effect of the ac-
tions of a specific firm.
It is further recommended that the primary emphasis of government
regulation of business should be directed against trade practices which
produce adverse economic results. Market structure should not be reg-
ulated unless there is clear evidence of the development of undesirable
economic effects such as higher prices, a lower rate of technological
growth, product deterioration, or an inability to satisfy consumer needs.
In most situations, the existing countervailing political and economic
power groups will force the firm to function at an efficient level. Fur-
thermore, appropriate tax legislation could eliminate any profit not
commensurate with the amount of capital invested.
The key to whether the market is performing properly should rest
in an analysis of the policies within the industry to raise prices and
create "excessive" profits, encourage technological advancement, main-
tain and improve product quality, and satisfy the consumer's demand
for the product. This approach should be termed, "pragmatic com-
petition" as it evaluates a market solely on its performance (i.e., the
actual economic results). The concept of pragmatic competition
should enable the lawyer and the economist to reconcile their differ-
ences. The economists will be able to focus their attention on eco-
nomic results and on the establishment of business norms. The lawyer
will be able to concentrate on harmful trade practices and delve into
market structure only when concrete adverse economic results are
present or probable. Both professions will no longer be required to
rely upon the nebulous concept of "competition" as a yardstick in
their analysis. Under pragmatic competition, an examination is first
made of the economic results, such as prices, quality of the product, in-
novation and resource allocation. These factors become the criteria in
adjudicating the social worth of the firm and the legality of any power
possessed by that firm. Only after a finding of adverse economic con-
sequences would the market structure be investigated in attempting toF
devise the appropriate remedial action.
CONCLUSION
It is doubtful that the policymakers will heed the suggestions ad-
vanced herein, but what is important is that an immediate re-examina-
tion be undertaken of the existing legislation regulating economic
power and trade practices. It is only by self-analysis that the myths
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and misconceptions that arise can be challenged, and, if necessary,
eliminated. A national committee should be created to re-examine the
underlying concepts of business regulation and to recommend the future
direction of the social control of business. This committee should
include not only antitrust specialists but also representatives of busi-
ness, labor, government and the oft-forgotten consumer. The primary
task of this committee would be to evaluate "competition" as a guide-
line for business organization and operation. Preceding the national
evaluation, there must be a comprehensive empirical analysis under-
taken of various industries to ascertain the facts with respect to prices,
rate of profit, technological progress and resource allocation. This
study could serve as a reservoir of information from which the com-
mittee, Congress and the courts could develop a coherent policy for
controlling business.
It is imperative for this country to undertake this introspective analysis
in order to maintain a strong and prosperous economy composed of
privately owned firms. The basis of the government's framework of
control must involve a coalescence of law, economics and the real
world of business. A pragmatic evaluation is a prerequisite to such
unification.
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